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Abstract
This article discusses how the United States Constitution 
Article V Convention can be utilized to amend the consti-
tution. Considering the intense political climate and fre-
quent stagnation in Congress, the Article V convention is 
an avenue for the fifty U.S. states to spur legislative action 
without the cooperation of the U.S. Congress.  This paper 
explores whether an Article V Constitutional Convention 
could be utilized to start the process to identify and unify 
critical legislative initiatives amidst the current political cli-
mate.  Part II explains the function, process, and historical 
usage of Article V.  Part III discusses case law developments 
interpreting Article V.  Part IV examines individual state 
constitutional conventions and their efficacy.  Part V discuss 
the arguments for and against an Article V Constitutional 
Convention.
Keywords: constitutional convention; article V; constitu-
tional reform procedure; constitutional amendment; Uni-
ted States.
Resumo
Este artigo discute como a Convenção do Artigo V da 
Constituição dos Estados Unidos pode ser utilizada para 
emendar a Constituição. Considerando o clima político 
intenso e a frequente estagnação no Congresso, a Con-
venção do Artigo V é um caminho para os cinquenta 
Estados dos EUA estimularem ações legislativas sem a 
colaboração do Congresso. Este artigo explora se uma 
Convenção Constitucional do Artigo V poderia ser utiliza-
da para iniciar o processo para identificar e unificar inicia-
tivas legislativas críticas em meio ao atual clima político. 
A Parte II explica a função, o processo e o uso histórico do 
Artigo V. A Parte III discute os desenvolvimentos da juris-
prudência que interpretam o Artigo V. A Parte IV examina 
individualmente convenções constitucionais estaduais e 
sua eficácia. A Parte V discute os argumentos a favor e 
contra a Convenção Constitucional do Artigo V.
Palavras-chave: convenção constitucional; artigo V; 
procedimento de reforma constitucional; emenda con-
stitucional; Estados Unidos.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution Article V Convention is an untapped pathway to 
amend the constitution that has yet to be deployed.1  Considering the intense political 
climate and frequent stagnation in Congress, the Article V convention may be a vehicle 
for the fifty U.S. states to spur legislative action without the cooperation of the U.S. Con-
gress.2  However, an Article V Convention still relies on the participation of individual 
states, which may be a daunting task considering the polarization of American politics.3 
This paper explores whether an Article V Constitutional Convention could be 
utilized to start the process to identify and unify critical legislative initiatives amidst the 
current political climate.  Part II explains the function,  process, and historical usage of 
Article V.4  Part III discusses case law developments interpreting Article V.5  Part IV exa-
mines individual state constitutional conventions and their efficacy.6  Part V discuss the 
arguments for and against an Article V Constitutional Convention.7
2. WHAT IS THE ARTICLE V CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION?
Article V of the United States Constitution provides two avenues, each with two 
steps, to amend the Constitution.8  Article V states that:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this 
1  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 5.
2  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 5. 
3  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 6.
4  For further discussion of Article V, see infra notes 8 - 37 and accompanying text.
5  For further discussion of case law on Article V, see infra notes 38 – 44 and accompanying text.
6  For further discussion of state constitutional conventions, see infra notes 45 – 58 and accompanying text.
7  For further discussion of the argument surrounding Article V, see infra notes 59 – 77 and accompanying text.
8  See supra notes 9 – 17 and accompanying text.
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Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or 
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification 
may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made 
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the 
first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, wi-
thout its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.9
By way of the first avenue, Congress can propose an amendment by a vote of 
two-thirds of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.10  The amendment is 
then sent to the states to determine whether to ratify the amendment.11  If three-four-
ths of the states ratify the amendment, it is added to the Constitution.12  Thirty-three 
amendments have been proposed through this method, and twenty-seven have been 
ratified and added to the Constitution.13  Aside from the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 
no amendments have been added to the Constitution since 1971.14
The states can circumnavigate Congress through the second avenue if two-
thirds of state legislatures request Congress to call an Article V Constitutional conven-
tion to propose Constitutional amendments.15  If such a request is successfully made, 
the states must set the agenda for the convention and Congress must hold a conven-
tion limited to that agenda.16  Proposed amendments are then sent to the states for the 
same ratification process as if they were submitted by Congress.17   
The Framers’ intent behind Article V appears to have been to balance out the 
power of the federal government and allow the states to collectively act if Congress 
did not.18  Further, the Article V convention was intended to give more direct power 
to the people through their state legislatures.19  The Article V convention option was 
9  U.S. Const. art. V.
10   U.S. Const. art. V.
11   U.S. Const. art. V.
12  EDITORS OF THE TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW. Article V Constitutional Conventions: A Primer. Tennessee Law Review, vol. 78, n. 
3, p. 663-692, mar./may 2011. p. 664.
13   RAPPAPORT, Michael B.; STRAUSS, David A. Common Interpretation: Article V. National Constitution Center. Available at: 
<https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-v/article-v-by-michael-b-rappaport-and-david-a-s-
trauss/interp/22>. Last visited Jun 29, 2017.
14   RAPPAPORT, Michael B.; STRAUSS, David A. Common Interpretation: Article V. National Constitution Center. Available at: 
<https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-v/article-v-by-michael-b-rappaport-and-david-a-s-
trauss/interp/22>. Last visited Jun 29, 2017.
15  EDITORS OF THE TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW. Article V Constitutional Conventions: A Primer. Tennessee Law Review, vol. 78, n. 
3, p. 663-692, mar./may 2011. p. 664.
16  PULIGNANO, Vincent. A Known Unknown: The Call for an Article V Convention. Florida Law Review, vol. 67,  p. 151-160, 
2016. p. 152.
17  EDITORS OF THE TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW. Article V Constitutional Conventions: A Primer. Tennessee Law Review, vol. 78, n. 
3, p. 663-692, mar./may 2011. p. 664.
18  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 11.
19  PULIGNANO, Vincent. A Known Unknown: The Call for an Article V Convention. Florida Law Review, vol. 67,  p. 151-160, 
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added after George Mason commented that Congress would be unlikely to propose 
an amendment that would limit its own power, thus Article V was aimed to curtail Con-
gress’s power and provide more direct power to individual citizens through their state 
constitutional convention representatives.20  
Furthermore, the Framers intended that it would not be excessively difficult to 
call an Article V convention.21 Under the Articles of Confederation, every state needed 
to ratify proposed amendments, thus Article V aimed to make it easier for the people to 
change the Constitution.22
The Article V convention circumnavigates Congress and empowers people with 
the ability to amend the constitution, because “[a]lthough a convention is summoned 
by the Legislature, it derives its power from the sovereign people.”23  James Madison 
remarked in The Federalist Papers that “a constitutional road to the decision of the 
people, ought to be marked out, and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary 
occasions.”24
The Article V convention has not been effectively utilized to date.25  743 re-
quests for Article V conventions have been made over time, most of which occurred 
in the 1900s.26  Every state has petitioned for an Article V convention at some point.27 
Three notable examples are the campaigns for the direct election of senators by states, 
reapportionment of state legislatures, and a balanced budget requirement.28  The di-
rect election effort failed around the turn of the 20th century, but ultimately led to the 
2016. p. 151.
20  ROGERS, James Kenneth. The Other Way to Amend the Constitution: The Article V Constitutional Convention Amendment 
Process. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Cambridge, vol. 30, p. 1005-1022, 2007. p. 1007.
21  HANSON, Walker. The States’ Power to Effectuate Constitutional Change: Is Congress Currently Required to Convene a Natio-
nal Convention for the Proposing of Amendments to the United States Constitution. Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y, vol. 9, n. 1, p. 245-?, 
2011. p. 249-249.
22  HANSON, Walker. The States’ Power to Effectuate Constitutional Change: Is Congress Currently Required to Convene a Natio-
nal Convention for the Proposing of Amendments to the United States Constitution. Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y, vol. 9, n. 1, p. 245-?, 
2011. p. 248-249.
23  In re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me. 491, 167 A. 176, 179 (1933)
24  MADISON, James. No. 49. In: HAMILTON, Alexander; MADISON, James; JAY, John. The Federalist Papers. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008.
25  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. 
26  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 9.
27  PENROSE, Mary Margaret. Conventional Wisdom: Acknowledging Uncertainty in the Unknown. Tennessee Law Review, vol. 
78, p. 789-805, 2011. p. 793.
28  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 12-13.
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Seventeenth Amendment, therefore providing a good example of the “prodding effect,” 
where the effort from states is sufficient to prod Congress to act in a given area.29  
The apportionment initiative gained the support of thirty-three states in the 
1950s; however, some states withdrew their applications over time.30  An initiative for 
a federal budget amendment came close to an Article V convention with the support 
of thirty-two of the requisite thirty-eight states.31  Similarly to the direct election cam-
paign, the federal budget initiative prodded Congress to enact the Gramm-Rudman
-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which required 
a balanced budget by 1993.32  After the budget amendment effort, Article V convention 
interest waned until recent years.33  
Efforts for a balanced budget amendment continue, with twenty seven state 
applications as of 2015.34  In 2010, the Tea Party gained traction surrounding the Repeal 
Amendment, which would allow for the repeal of any federal law if the legislatures of 
two-thirds of the states agreed.  The Repeal Amendment gained the support of twelve 
states.35  According to a Harris Interactive survey in 2005, more than sixty-five percent 
of the population supports seven theoretical amendments where Congress has not ac-
ted.36  As of 2011, thirty-three states were applying for a general Article V constitutional 
convention.37  
29  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 14.
30  EDITORS OF THE TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW. Article V Constitutional Conventions: A Primer. Tennessee Law Review, vol. 78, n. 
3, p. 663-692, mar./may 2011. p. 666.
31  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017.
32  EDITORS OF THE TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW. Article V Constitutional Conventions: A Primer. Tennessee Law Review, vol. 78, n. 
3, p. 663-692, mar./may 2011. p. 666.
33  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 5.
34  Doing the math for a new Constitutional Convention - National Constitution Center, National Constitution Center – consti-
tutioncenter.org (2015), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/doing-the-math-for-a-new-constitutional-convention (last visited 
Jul 17, 2017).
35  ZERNIKE, Kate. Proposed Amendment Would Enable States to Repeal Federal Law. The New York Times, New York, Dec 20, 
2010. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/us/politics/20states.html>. Last visited Jul 2, 2017.
36  ROGERS, James Kenneth. The Other Way to Amend the Constitution: The Article V Constitutional Convention Amendment 
Process. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Cambridge, vol. 30, p. 1005-1022, 2007. p. 1007.
37  PAULSEN, Michael Stokes. How to Count to Thirty-Four: the Constitutional Case for a Constitutional Convention. Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y, Cambridge, vol. 34, p. 837-?, 2011. p. 857.
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3. CASE LAW ON ARTICLE V
Amendments to the Constitution are primarily a legislative function.38  The pre-
sident has no official role in the Article V amendment process.39  In Hollingsworth v. 
Virginia, the Supreme Court held that constitutional amendments should not be pre-
sented to the president for signature and the president has no veto power over a cons-
titutional amendment because of the lack of role set out in Article V.40
The Constitution does not set any deadlines for ratification of proposed amend-
ments.41  In Dillon v. Gloss, the Supreme Court held that Congress has the power to 
impose a deadline for ratification, stating that:
We do not find anything in the article which suggests that an amendment, once pro-
posed, is to be open to ratification for all time, or that ratification in some of the states 
may be separated from that in others by many years and yet be effective. We do find that 
which strongly suggests the contrary. First, proposal and ratification are not treated as 
unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being 
that they are not to be widely separated in time. Secondly, it is only when there is deemed 
to be a necessity therefore that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable impli-
cation being that, when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently. 
Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, and is to be 
effective when had in three-fourths of the states, there is a fair implication that it must be 
sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of states to reflect the will of the people in 
all sections at relatively the same period, which, of course, ratification scattered through 
a long series of years would not do.42
Congress has since imposed a seven-year deadline for ratification of amend-
ments.43  This can prove challenging for an Article V convention because of the time-
consuming process of organizing movements and state legislatures in coordination 
with other states.44  
38  Wilson v. Guggenheim, 70 F. Supp. 417, 419 (E.D.S.C. 1947).
39  Hollingsworth v. State of Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 379 (1798).
40  Hollingsworth v. State of Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 379 (1798).
41   U.S. Const. art. V
42  Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374-75 (1921). 
43  RAPPAPORT, Michael B.; STRAUSS, David A. Common Interpretation: Article V. National Constitution Center. Available at: 
<https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-v/article-v-by-michael-b-rappaport-and-david-a-s-
trauss/interp/22>. Last visited Jun 29, 2017.
44  NEALE, Thomas H. The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, Oct 22, 2012.  Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42592.pdf>. Last visited Jun 29, 
2017. p. 5.
255Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 5, n. 1, p. 249-260, jan./abr. 2018.
Is it time for a U.S. Article V Constitutional convention? A brief discussion about American constitutional reform procedure
4. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
State constitutional conventions can provide a model for the way a potential 
Article V convention should or could function.45  Every state has amended its constitu-
tion, and the states collectively have amended their constitutions 7,481 times.46  All of 
the states allow their state legislatures to call constitutional conventions, and fourte-
en states provide for the people to periodically decide by referendum whether to call 
a constitutional convention.47  For instance, Florida holds a commission every twenty 
years to determine whether to amend their constitution.48  Fifteen states have held 
constitutional conventions since 1965.49  
Additionally, New York will have a referendum on the ballot this November to 
determine whether to hold a constitutional convention.50  This option is available to 
New Yorkers every twenty years; however, it has not been exercised for the past eighty 
years.51  Many believe that voters will decide to call for a convention this year based on 
motivations surrounding the current President and federal administration.52  Groups 
campaigning for a constitutional convention champion causes such as campaign finan-
ce reform, redistricting, term limits, marijuana legalization, the judiciary structure, and 
home rule for counties and municipalities.53
The process for a New York constitutional convention commences when a ma-
jority of voters elect to do so.54  As a result, electors from every senate district elect 
three delegates to send to the convention, and electors voting at the same election 
elect fifteen delegates-at-large.55  Elected delegates would convene for the convention 
45  DINAN, Josh. State Constitutional Amendments and American Constitutionalism. Okla. City U. L. Rev., vol. 41, n. 1, p. 27-52, 
mar./may 2016.
46  DINAN, Josh. State Constitutional Amendments and American Constitutionalism. Okla. City U. L. Rev., vol. 41, n. 1, p. 27-52, 
mar./may 2016. p. 30.
47  DINAN, Josh. State Constitutional Amendments and American Constitutionalism. Okla. City U. L. Rev., vol. 41, n. 1, p. 27-52, 
mar./may 2016. p. 32-33.
48  DINAN, Josh. State Constitutional Amendments and American Constitutionalism. Okla. City U. L. Rev., vol. 41, n. 1, p. 27-52, 
mar./may 2016. p. 34.
49  Other State Solutions for Convention | Citizens’ Committee for an Effective Constitution, Nyconstitution.org. Available at: 
<http://nyconstitution.org/other-states/convention/1965-15-states-have-held-constitutional-conventions >. Last visited Jul 
16, 2017.
50  FODERARO, Lisa W. A Constitutional Convention for New York? This May Be the Year. The New York Times, New York, Jul 5, 
2017. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/nyregion/constitutional-convention-voting-new-york.html>.
51  FODERARO, Lisa W. A Constitutional Convention for New York? This May Be the Year. The New York Times, New York, Jul 5, 
2017. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/nyregion/constitutional-convention-voting-new-york.html>.
52  FODERARO, Lisa W. A Constitutional Convention for New York? This May Be the Year. The New York Times, New York, Jul 5, 
2017. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/nyregion/constitutional-convention-voting-new-york.html>.
53  FODERARO, Lisa W. A Constitutional Convention for New York? This May Be the Year. The New York Times, New York, Jul 5, 
2017. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/nyregion/constitutional-convention-voting-new-york.html>.
54  See infra notes 9 – 17 and accompanying text.
55  Article XIX, Section 2, New York Constitution
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in April 2018.56  The convention has the power to appoint officers and set the rules of 
proceedings.57  Amendments are approved by a majority of delegates, and approved 
amendments are submitted to a vote of electors six weeks after the convention.58
5. SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION
Momentum has been building surrounding recent attempts to call an Article V 
convention. Current dissolution and polarization of U.S. citizens has emerged due to 
the political climate.59  Consequently, the intended use of Article V at this time would 
correspond with the Framers’ intent of giving more direct power to the people.60  Indivi-
duals’ trust and confidence in the government has reached a low point, and as of 2016, 
only 42 percent of citizens trust the country’s political leaders.61  
The 2016 presidential election was composed of poorly rated candidates, and 
many attribute Donald Trump’s success in the election to voter dissatisfaction with the 
government and politicians.62  Trump’s presidency is extraordinary, given the factor that 
not since the 1928 election of Herbert Hoover has the U.S. had a president that did not 
have either a political or military background.63  Moreover, Americans trust in Washin-
gton is at historical lows, with more than eighty percent of the population believing 
there is little to no trust that the government in D.C. is capable of doing what is right.64 
Considering the election results, an Article V convention could be a means of 
restoring federalism where the President and Congress do not impose constitutio-
nal limits.65  Additionally, polarization between political parties is growing over time, 
56  Article XIX, Section 2, New York Constitution
57  Article XIX, Section 2, New York Constitution
58  Article XIX, Section 2, New York Constitution 
59  DOHERTY, Carroll. 7 things to know about polarization in America Pew Research Center. Pew Research, Jun 12, 2014. Availa-
ble at: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-america>. Last visited Jul 
18, 2017.
60   See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
61  GALLUP.COM. “Americans’ Trust in Political Leaders, Public at New Lows”. Available at: <http://www.gallup.com/
poll/195716/americans-trust-political-leaders-public-new-lows.aspx>. Last visited Jul 17, 2017.
62  GALLUP.COM. “Americans’ Trust in Political Leaders, Public at New Lows”. Available at: <http://www.gallup.com/
poll/195716/americans-trust-political-leaders-public-new-lows.aspx>. Last visited Jul 17, 2017.
63  SOUSA, Gregory. U.S. Presidents With The Least Prior Political Experience. World Atlas, 2016. Available at: <http://www.worl-
datlas.com/articles/u-s-presidents-with-the-least-prior-political-experience.html>. Last visited Jul 31, 2017.
64  GALLUP.COM “Trust in Government”. Available at: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx>. Last visited 
Jul 31, 2017.
65  NATELSON, Robert G. The Article V Convention Process and the Restoration of Federalism. Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, Cambridge, 
vol. 36, n. 3, p. 955-960, 2016.
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resulting in deadlocks in government.66  President Obama began to use executive or-
ders to implement policy amidst Congress’s failure to act.67
The wide use and popularity of the internet and social media also make now 
the opportune time for an Article V Convention because initiatives for amendments 
can be organized and executed much broader and faster than the prior attempts in the 
1960s-1980s.68
However, many arguments against an Article V Constitution exist.69  For ins-
tance, many scholars agree that the risk of a runaway convention is the most notable 
problem with a potential Article V constitutional convention.70  The possibility of a “ru-
naway convention,” or a convention where adverse amendments are adopted, is also 
cited as a primary concern with an Article V convention.71  
Similarly, some argue that an Article V convention could result in replacing the 
entire constitution.72  However, this risk is curtailed several ways.73  First, an Article V 
convention can be limited by issue.74  Second, the ratification process provides a safety 
net in case delegates propose undesirable amendments.75
The brief text of Article V leaves several questions open, such as how convention 
members are chosen, how convention rules are adopted, and Congress’s power to cre-
ate an alternative ratification procedure.76  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has pro-
vided some clarity on the process, and Congress can make further rules as necessary.77
66  DOHERTY, Carroll. 7 things to know about polarization in America Pew Research Center. Pew Research, Jun 12, 2014. Availa-
ble at: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-america>. Last visited Jul 
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6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the political climate, polarization of political parties, discontent-
ment of the 2016 Presidential election and widespread distrust of government war-
rants use of the Article V convention as intended by the Constitutional framers.78  The 
question remains: has history brought the United States to an “extraordinary occasion” 
as envisioned by James Madison and the other framers to finally implement an Article 
V Constitutional convention?79  An Article V convention may be the path to quell the 
political discord and congressional inaction and empower U.S. citizens and states to 
circumnavigate Congress or at the very least “prod” it into legislative action.80   However, 
as awe-inspiring as the idea may be to actually curtail Congress’s power and provide 
citizens and individuals with some control of the legislative agenda, the prodigious 
task of a Constitutional convention requires the active participation of individual states 
and citizens, given the division in American politics, such a task may be possible but 
formidable.81 
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